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. Fas
On June 5,1995, Christopher James Beck ("Beck") traveled from Philadel-
phia to Arlington County with a preconceived plan to kill his former employer
William Miller ("Mller"). When he arrived at the home shared by Miller, Flor-
ence Marks ("Marks") and David Kaplan ("Kaplan"), he broke in through a
basement window. He took a .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol from Miller's
apartment and layin wait in the basement. After waiting for several hours, Beck
heard someone entering the basement. He raised the gun, dosed his eyes and
fired two shots as the door opened. When he opened his eyes, he saw Marks
lying dead. Beck later told police that after shooting Marks, he stabbed her in the
right buttock and penetrated her vagina with the handle of a hammer to make it
appear that Marks had been raped.
About an hour after Beck killed Marks, Niller returned home. Beck, hiding
on the stairs leading to the second floor, shot Miller five times and killed him.
Beck then covered the bodywith a blanket and placed it in Kaplan's apartment.
Kaplan later returned to find Beck in his apartment with a gun in his hand and
Miller's bodylying on the floor. Beck then shot Kaplan in the back of the head,
but did not kill him. As Kaplan lay on the floor talking to Beck, Beck fired
several more rounds at Kaplan, then stabbed him in the head. After killing
Kaplan, Beck stole some cash, several guns, two bicycles and Miller's gun and
car, and left the scene. Once he returned to Pennsylvania, he wiped the car to
remove fingerprints and abandoned it.2
When Arlington County Police first interviewed Beck, he claimed that he
was transporting bicycles from Tennessee at the time. When his alibi could not
be corroborated, Beck confessed to all three murders. An Arlington County
grand jury indicted Beck for capital murder in the death of each of the three
victims? Later, the grand jury added charges of rape and capital murder during
the commission of rape in the death of Marks. After the trial court denied Beck's
motion to suppress the statements he made to police, Beck pleaded guilty to all
counts and the trial court accepted the guilty plea. The trial court then heard
1. Beck v. Angelone, 261 F.3d 377, 380-81 (4th Gr. 2001).
2. Id at 381-82.
3. Id at 382; sealso VA. CODE ANN. S 182-31(4) (icXie Supp. 2001) (defining capital
murder as "the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of
robberyorattempted robbery"); VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(7 (fichie Supp. 2001) (defining capital
murder as "the willful, deliberate and premeditated killing o more than one person as a part of the
same act or transaction").
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evidence of aggravation and mitigation at the sentencing phase; after finding
future dangerousness and vileness, the trial judge sentenced Beck to death for
each of the capital murder counts and to four life terms plus fiftythree years in
prison for the non-capital counts
After his direct appeal and petition for state habeas corpus review in the
Supreme Court of Virginia failed, Beck pe *'oned for a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Beck's
habeas petition claimed that the Commonwealth failed to prove all elements of
its case beyond a reasonable doubt, that his guilty plea was constitutionally
flawed, that the trial court failed to consider his psychiatric condition, that he was
incompetent to participate in the proceedings, and that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel On September 27, 2000, the district court dismissed
Beck's habeas petition. On November 28, 2000, Beck noted an appeal in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Gruit in March of 2001 he
applied to the same court for a certificate of appealability'
H. Hdd
The Fourth Crcuit held that Beck was not entitled to a certificate of
appealability because he failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right."
III A n4~sz /Apia&w mtV~
A. C~Qr' Appw&Nkt
The standard for the certificate of pealability applied by the Fourth
Circuit was first articulated by the Unied States Supreme Court in S"k vu
Md3xe 7 The Court in Slade held that in cases in which the district court has
dismissed the habeas petition on procedural grounds, the petitioner is entitled to
a certificate of appealability if reasonable jurists could differ as to whether the
petition states a valid constitutional claim and if reasonable jurists could debate
the propriety of the district court's procedural ruling.' Because the district court
dismissed Beck's petition on the grounds that his claims were procedurally
barred, the Fourth Crcuit held Beck to a standard requiring him to establish that
not onlycould reasonable jurists debate whether the petition stated the denial of
4. Ba*, 261 F.3d at 383.
5. &L at 384-86.
6. Id at 380;swe28 US.C. S2253(c) (Supp. V 1999) (providing, inperunent part, that appeal
offinalorderinhabeasproceedingarising from stae court mynot proceed unless court of appeals
ofs isue cetfct fpaa~t petitioneb-as nmade a sbstatahwn of the dna a constitutional rigt')
7. S"k v. McDaniel, 529 US. 473 (2000).
8. Id at 484.
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a valid constitutional right, but also that reasonable jurists could debate whether
the district court ruled correctly on the procedural issue.9
The Fourth CGrcuit ruled first on Beck's substantive claim-that he was
incompetent to appear in court to plead guilty and to participate in his sentencing
hearing.1" The court reviewed the statements Beck made to police, the record in
the trial court, and the statements of mental health experts from both sides in
reaching the conclusion that Beck had not met his burden in establishing the
existence of a valid constitutional clairn. As Beck failed to establish a valid
constitutional claim, the court did not address the procedural question. 2
The certificate of appealability is the prerequisite to appellate review of a
final order in a habeas corpus petition arising from a state proceeding. 3 A
federal court may only grant a writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner has estab-
lished that the final judgment in the state court resulted in a decision "contrary
to, or [involving] an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal
law"'" While the Fourth rcztuit stated that the standard applied merely required
Beck to show that his petition stated a "valid claim of the denial of a constitu-
tional right;" the analysis of the Fourth Cuuit establishing that Beck had failed
to meet his burden under Slade resembled an adjudication of Beck's claims on the
merits.
15
B. Tht dwal and SulwtatiCe Cw" y
In determining that Beckwas not entitled to a certificate of appealability, the
Fourth Circuit fully considered the merits of Beck's substantive competency
claims based on his assertion that he was incompetent to plead guilty to capital
murder and that he was incompetent to appear at his sentencing hearing.'6 The
court explained that a defendant may make not only a substantive competency
claim considering whether he was in fact incompetent during the pendencyof the
proceedings, but he also may raise the procedural competency claim as to
whether the trial court permitted the proceedings to advance in spite of facts
raising a genuine doubt as to Beck's competencyto participate.'" The substantive
inquiry mist consider whether the petitioner showed bya preponderance of the
evidence that he was in fact incompetent to stand trial; by comparison, the
9. Bak, 261 F.3d at 387 (citig Slade, 529 US. at 484).
10. Id at 385 n.10, 387. The court followed Slack in beginning its analysis with -'the issue
whose answer is more apparent from the record and argumnts." Id at 387 (citing Slack, 529 US.
at 485).
11. Id at 388-92.
12. Id at 392 n.14.
13. 28 US.C S 2253(c)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
14. 28 US.C S 2254(d)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
15. Be, 261 F.3d at 387.
16. Id at 388-92.
17. Id at 387-88.
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procedural inquiry requires only proof of facts sufficient to raise a doubt as to
competency
TheFourth Crcuit denied Beck's request for the certificate of appealability
because there was "no doubt that Beck was competent to appear in court to
plead guilty... and at the sentencing phase of his case."19 The court first deter-
mined that Beck was competent when he gave his statements to police because
the record showed that he was rational, aware and able to recall facts clearlywhen
giving his statements. 0 Second, the court determined that Beck was competent
during the proceedings because he executed a clear plea memorandum, engaged
in a detailed and extensive colloquy with the trial court regarding his plea and
gave cogent responses to the court's questions.21 Third, the court found that
Beck had not behaved in any manner that would cause his attorney or the court
to have concerns regarding his competency.' Finally, the trial court considered
the mental health evidence available and deemed Beck empiricallyto be compe-
tent.23
On the issue of mental health evidence, the court considered the statements
of three mental health experts who examined Beck-one of whom was retained
by the Commonwealth and two of whom were retained by Beck24 Beck's
experts agreed that he expressed himself clearly, thought logically and rationally,
and in spite of his severe attention disorder and learning disability, appeared able
to assist his counsel 2 The Commonwealth's expert generally agreed that Beck
did not show signs of mental affliction, but also noted that "it is somewhat
characteristic of Mr. Beck to be somewhat moody and emotionallyunstable, but
medication still can be helpful [to him]."26 On the basis of this evidence, the
court determined that Beck was actually competent during the trial court pro-
ceedings and was not entitled to a certificate of appealability on his substantive
claims.
Beck failed however to raise a procedural competency claim. In such a
claim, he could have asserted that the trial court ignored facts that may have
raised a doubt as to his competency and that, in consideration of these facts, the
trial court should have granted him a hearing on the issue of competency. In Pate
v Rodino,28 an Illinois murder case in which the trial court denied the defendant
18. Id




23. Id at 389.
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id at 391.
27. Id
28. 383 US. 375 (1966).
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a competencyhearing in the face of evidence suggesting the defendant's incom-
petence, the United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires a
trial judge to inquire into the defendant's competence when facts in evidence
raise a "bona fide doubt" as to whether the defendant is competent.29 In Thqx
v Missowi, the Court held that the trial court bears the responsibilityof continu-
ally considering a variety of factors in determining whether, at any stage in the
proceedings, inquiryshould be made into the defendant's competence.31 Pateand
Dqx stand for the proposition that the trial court should inquire into the defen-
dant's competence on its own motion. 2
The conscientious defense attorney ought to raise a procedural competency
attack in any case in which facts were before the trial court which could have
called the defendant's competency into doubt at any stage in the proceedings.
Although the facts concerning his mental condition may have marshaled against
a finding of incompetency, the court certainlyhad facts before it which mayhave
raised doubt as to Beck's ability to assist in his defense."
C IhOeiwAssist= and the GuidtyPlea
Beck also raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on habeas
review, asserting that had his trial counsel explained to him the elements of the
crimes with which he was charged, he would not have pleaded guilty. Claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel are typically controlled by the two-pronged
test set out in Stri&/adv W i 35 which requires that the petitioner prove
that trial counsel's performance fell below the reasonable standard of care and
that petitioner suffered prejudice due to the negligent representation of trial
counseL6 The Fourth Crcuit explained that the analysis underStriktmarchanges
when a petitioner seeks to invalidate a guilty plea because of ineffective assis-
tance; in such a case, petitioner must show that trial counsel's performance was
unreasonably deficient, and that but for that deficient performance of counsel,
the defendant would not have pleaded guilty'
The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in cases in which the defen-
dant has pleaded guilty is difficult for two reasons. First, in Bek, the court
applied a strong presumption that the guilty plea was valid. If there is no
evidence that the defendant did not understand the consequences of the guilty
29. Pate v. Robinson, 383 US. 375, 386 (1966).
30. 420 US. 162 (1975).
31. Drope v. Missouri, 420 US. 162, 181 (1975).
32. Pate, 383 US. at 386; sw hque, 420 US. at 181.
33. Bek, 261 F.3d at 391.
34. l at 393-94.
35. 466 US. 668 (1984).
36. Stricldand v. Washington, 466 US. 668, 687 (1984).
37. Bea, 261 F.3d at 394 (citing Hil v. Lockhart, 474 US. 52, 59 (1985)).
38. Id at 394.
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plea or that the defendant was coerced into entering the guilty plea, it is highly
unlikly that the court will find the prejudice condition to have been satisfied.39
Second, if the guilty plea appears to be the product of the strategic advice of
defense counsel, the court will not be likelyto question the wisdom of that advice
and deem the performance of counsel to have been deficient.4°
IV. E&a
On October 18, 2001, Beck was executed by lethal injection at the
Greensville Correctional Center, he was the second person to die in Virginia's
death chamber in 2001.41 In the days preceding his death, Beck lost an appeal
before the United States Supreme Court and a Supreme Court of Virginia review
of a lower court ruling denying him new DNA testing.42 Beck's attorneys also
submitted a clemency petition to Governor James Gilmore, maintaining that
Beck's history of childhood neglect and abuse were powerful mitigating factors
which required sparing Beck's life."3 Gilmore ultimately denied the clemency
petition, noting Beck's guilty pleas and the fact that "there has never been any




Frank Green, State Exems 2ntMan This Yw, Ria-I T3FMES-DISPATCK Oct. 19, 2001,
Id at B2.
Frank Green, Spaig qfders L Aske4 RI. TMES- DISPATC, Oct. 15, 2001, at B2.
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